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BIO FAMILY 2.0: CAN THE AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM FINALLY FIND PERMANENCY FOR “LEGAL
ORPHANS” WITH A STATUTE TO REINSTATE
PARENTAL RIGHTS?
Meredith L. Schalick, JD, MS*
The American child welfare system terminates parental rights for thousands of chil-
dren each year even though adoptive families have not yet been identified for the
children. Every year, there are more than 100,000 of these “legal orphans” waiting
for new families. Given the lower rates of adoptions for children of color and older
children, and the poor outcomes for most youth who age out of the foster care sys-
tem, the American child welfare system must start to think differently about
permanency options for children. This Article proposes a model statutory provision
to reinstate parental rights under certain circumstances to give these “legal or-
phans” a second chance with their rehabilitated biological parents.
Although several states have enacted reinstatement provisions, the criteria and
processes for reinstating parental rights differ significantly among their statutory
schemes. The model statute outlined in this Article uses child welfare data reported
by each state to determine when and how reinstatement of parental rights should be
evaluated by the courts.
LISA’S STORY
My client Lisa1 was turning sixteen, and the next court date was a
big one for her. In addition to celebrating her birthday, I was taking
her out to dinner to discuss whether she wanted to ask the court to
* Clinical Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law – Camden. Christina
Congdon, Kelly Grant, Rebekah Lederer, Khushboo Shah, and Heather Stolinski provided
research assistance for this Article. I thank Dean Rayman Solomon and the Clinical
Scholarship Work Group at the Rutgers School of Law – Camden for their support and
encouragement. I would also like to thank my parents, George and Luellen Schalick, for
showing me what good parenting is. Finally, I am forever grateful that my precious Emilia
gave me the opportunity to be a parent.
1. Lisa is not the real name of my client. In the hope that this Article inspires or in-
forms efforts to enact or amend statutes to reinstate parental rights, it is dedicated to her.
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change her permanency goal2 from adoption to independent
living.3
Lisa’s parents’ rights were terminated4 when she was nine, and
she had been placed with two families that, unfortunately, decided
not to adopt her.5 After the second “pre-adoptive placement”6 did
not work out three years earlier, Lisa lived in group homes and resi-
dential programs for adolescent girls.
Lisa had previously acknowledged that her age and past behav-
ioral problems made it very unlikely that her caseworker would find
another pre-adoptive placement.7 Accordingly, for the last year or
2. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, An Act to Promote the Adoption of
Children in Foster Care, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)) (requiring that state child welfare agencies provide reasonable
efforts to reunify families but then file for termination of parental rights if the problems still
exist and reunification is not feasible). The child welfare system requires that children in
placement have a permanency goal, which for most children starts out as reunification with
their parent(s). See id. § 101. However, within twelve months after placement, there must be a
permanency hearing where a judge decides whether the goal remains reunification or
changes to another permanency option, such as termination of parental rights followed by
adoption. Id. § 302.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000). For some older children involved with the child
welfare system, a court may approve a permanency goal of “Another Planned Permanent
Living Arrangement,” or “APPLA.” In some states, like where Lisa lived, APPLA translates
into a goal of “independent living” for the child. In other words, children with the goal of
independent living are provided services to help them prepare for adulthood (such as
budgeting, job searching, cooking, etc.) and often live in semi-supervised programs that help
the children transition to living on their own. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., FOM
722-7, CHILDRENS FOSTER CARE MANUAL: FOSTER CARE—PERMANENCY PLANNING 14–20 (2012),
available at http://www.mfia.state.mi.us/olmweb/ex/fom/722-7.pdf.
4. To establish termination of parental rights and thus allow for adoption of a child,
there must be a showing that termination is in the best interest of the child, in addition to a
showing that the child cannot be returned home. These criteria may be required by statute
or by case law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 39.802, .806 (2013). In many states, the first step in the
analysis involves the court determining whether there is clear and convincing evidence of
parental misconduct or inability. See, e.g., id. § 39.806. Second, the court determines whether
termination is in the best interest of the child. See, e.g., id. § 39.810. Thus, there must first be
jurisdictional grounds for termination that relate to parental misconduct or incapacity of the
child’s parent(s). If jurisdictional grounds are found, then the inquiry turns to dispositional
grounds, which relate to the best interest of the child. See DONALD T. KRAMER, 3 LEGAL RIGHTS
OF CHILDREN § 28:18 (2d ed. 2005).
5. Data collection is not done to track broken adoptions, but attorneys who work in the
foster care system find that these broken adoptions result from the age of the child or adop-
tive parent, the child’s behavioral and emotional issues, prior placement history, sexual
abuse, attachment of sibling groups, prenatal drug or alcohol abuse, and/or attachment to
biological parents. Dawn Post & Brian Zimmerman, The Revolving Doors of Family Court: Con-
fronting Broken Adoptions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2012).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(i)(2)(E) (2008). A “pre-adoptive placement” is a term com-
monly used in the child welfare system to describe the placement of a child on a trial basis
with a family that is considering adopting the child.
7. Post & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 440 (explaining that older children and chil-
dren with special needs are less likely to be adopted in the child welfare system); see also infra
Part I.B.
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so, Lisa had been talking about getting into an independent living
program. Her plan was to get a part-time job at a hair salon, finish
high school, and then go to cosmetology school to “do hair.”
As we talked about the pros and cons of asking the court to
change her permanency goal to independent living, Lisa became
quiet and pensive. Given that this teen very rarely stopped talking, I
knew something was troubling her. Lisa looked up at me from her
burger and fries and said, “If they aren’t going to be able to find me
a new family, why can’t I just go back and live with my mom again?”
It was a perfectly logical question. Lisa went on to share that she
had learned from cousins8 that her mother was had finally quit
drugs, had moved to another state, and had a baby with her new
husband.
The questions exploded in my mind. Could Lisa’s mother get
her parental rights back? Could we undo the termination order
somehow?9 What about her mother applying for custody or even
adopting Lisa?10 How could I find out if her mother really turned
her life around enough for the child welfare system to give them a
second chance at being a family? Does the child welfare agency
have to agree to reconsider Lisa’s mother, or could I just file a mo-
tion in advance of the upcoming permanency hearing?
Unfortunately, the American child welfare system usually does
not provide straightforward answers to these questions. As I would
have to explain to Lisa, the child welfare system’s efforts at finding
permanency options for children are often far from logical.
INTRODUCTION
The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) was enacted
in 1997 in response to concerns about the length of time children
were living in foster care while waiting for reunification with their
8. Older youth and youth who leave the child welfare system regularly report contact
with biological family members even after their parents’ rights have been terminated. See
infra text accompanying notes 78–79. The fact that Lisa was in touch with family members is
not surprising, particularly in a world where children can use the internet and social media
to find and communicate with relatives. See generally Mary E. Collins et al., The Permanence of
Family Ties: Implications for Youth Transitioning from Foster Care, 78 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 54
(2008) (providing an overview of recent studies finding that former foster youth live with
biological family members after exiting the child welfare system).
9. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
10. See LaShanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-Terminating Parental
Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 319, 337–44 (2010); see also Randi O’Donnell, A Second Chance
for Children and Families: A Model Statute to Reinstate Parental Rights After Termination, 48 FAM.
CT. REV. 362, 367–70 (2010).
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biological parents.11 Congress intended for ASFA to promote adop-
tion and other permanency options so children did not spend
extended time in foster care.12 ASFA created a fifteen-month win-
dow for parents to appropriately remedy the problems that led to
their children being removed from their custody and placed into
foster care.13 If, after receiving services from the child welfare sys-
tem, the problems or conditions still exist after the fifteen months,
the child welfare system may then pursue other permanency op-
tions for the child, such as termination of parental rights followed
by adoption.14 This focus on permanency generally, and adoption
specifically, is evidenced by the federal Adoption Incentive Pro-
gram, which ASFA also created. The Adoption Incentive Program
rewards states for increasing the number of children adopted from
foster care.15
Despite ASFA’s intentions and child welfare agencies and courts’
efforts, many children do not find a permanent family after their
parents’ rights are terminated. ASFA’s limited timeframe for
reunification and its push towards other permanency options has
created a crisis where more than 100,000 children have had their
parents’ rights terminated but no adoptive family has been identi-
fied.16 As the years pass for these children who have not yet been
adopted, the limbo status can be very difficult, as many children
lose their sense of security and permanency.17 In the meantime, the
children’s parents may have successfully remediated the issues that
led to the termination of their rights, a process that may take more
than the approximately one year ASFA allows. Indeed, in a survey of
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012) (explaining that child’s health and safety shall be para-
mount concerns and that reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families);
143 CONG. REC. H10787 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennelly) (“This legisla-
tion we can all agree on is putting children on a fast track from foster care to safe and loving
permanent homes.”).
12. See 143 CONG. REC. H10787 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennelly).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2012) (requiring that states move forward with terminat-
ing parental rights when children have been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months unless the child was placed with a relative or there are compelling reasons
not to terminate parental rights, like the child is over the age of twelve and does not want to
be adopted).
14. See id.
15. Penelope L. Maza, Using Administrative Date to Reward Agency Performance: The Case of
the Federal Adoption Incentive Program, 79 CHILD WELFARE 444, 444–54 (2000).
16. See Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales From the Age of ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 129, 145 (2001); Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termina-
tion of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q.
121 (1995) (finding that even before the ASFA, legal orphans were being created with no ties
to biological parents, but without an adoptive home to go to); infra note 25.
17. See Patrick Parkinson, Child Protection, Permanency Planning and Children’s Right to Fam-
ily Life, 17 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 147, 159 (2003).
WINTER 2014] Bio Family 2.0 471
twenty judges spanning eighteen states, half of the judges reported
that twelve months is not a sufficient amount of time for substance-
abusing parents to rehabilitate. Two judges specifically echoed
these concerns in relation to parents with mental health chal-
lenges.18 As such, in those instances when biological parents have
later successfully resolved their problems, they should be revisited
as viable permanency options.
The process of reinstating parental rights involves parents who
have had their rights voluntarily or involuntarily terminated and
children with no legal parents who are wards of the child welfare
agency. Reinstatement is allowable if, after a period of time, the
child has not been adopted and a biological parent has remediated
the issue(s) that led to the prior termination. Under the most com-
mon scenario, both the child and biological parent want to reunify,
and a court determines that reinstatement and reunification is in
the child’s best interest. Although reinstatement of parental rights
18. In an attempt to address these concerns, a few judges reported approving six-month
extensions of reunification services to parents who were making steady progress but needed
more time to achieve their case plan goals. Racqual Ellis et al., The Timing of Termination of
Parental Rights: A Balancing Act for Children’s Best Interests, in CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF 9
(Publ’n No. 2009-40, 2009), available at http://childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/
09/Child_Trends-2009_09_09_RB_LegalOrphans.pdf. Child abuse and neglect due to paren-
tal substance abuse is prevalent in the United States. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS 98-40, PARENTAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE 4 (1997) (finding that, depending on the
area of the country examined, substance abuse was involved in up to ninety percent of all
child abuse or neglect cases. The study also showed that drug treatment may last up to two
years); SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., BLENDING PERSPECTIVES AND BUILDING COMMON GROUND: A REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CHILD PROTECTION 6 (1999), available at http://www.ncsacw.
samhsa.gov/files/BlendingPerspectives.pdf (noting that nearly one-third of drug users ob-
tain permanent abstinence from their first attempt at recovery. An additional one-third have
brief periods of substance use but eventually achieve long-term abstinence, and one-third
have chronic relapses that result in premature death from chemical addiction and related
consequences. These statistics are consistent with the life-long recovery rates of any chronic
lifestyle-related illness); Mary O’Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing
Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 243, 258 (1999) (arguing that drug dependency is a chronic, relapsing condition for
which there is no fast cure. Instead, it is a lifetime process of recovery, and expedited hear-
ings present problems for some parents seeking substance abuse treatment because
permanency decisions may be required before a parent is even admitted to a treatment pro-
gram and long before it can be determined whether a parent is likely to succeed in substance
abuse treatment). See generally Katherine A. Hort, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest
of the Child? AFSA’s Guidelines for the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879
(2001). Incarceration is also not solved within eighteen months. About 1.7 million children
have a parent in prison, and the average sentence length for non-violent criminal offenses for
state prisons is 51.6 months. Stephanie Sherry, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce Its
Negative Impact on Children of Incarcerated Parents, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 380, 380 (2010).
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may not be the best permanency solution for every child, it has
helped some children.19
This Article proposes a model statutory provision that would re-
instate parental rights under certain circumstances to give children
a second chance with their biological parent(s). In most jurisdic-
tions, litigants who have had their parental rights terminated can
try to undo the termination by filing a motion to vacate the court
order. However, creating a statutory right to apply for reinstate-
ment is preferable because it delineates a clear process and criteria
for courts to weigh when deciding whether a child should be placed
back with his rehabilitated biological parents. Further, a statutory
approach may account for the difficulties that many parents have in
persuading the court that reinstatement is legally justified.20
As demonstrated in this Article, it is worthwhile to look at all op-
tions for permanency for legal orphans created by the child welfare
system’s practices and timeframes, including the possibility that, af-
ter a designated period of time, the biological parents would be
able to provide a safe and permanent family for their biological
children. Although thirteen states have enacted reinstatement pro-
visions, the criteria for reinstating parental rights differs among
their statutory schemes. After reviewing the child welfare data re-
ported by each state, including the known outcomes for children
who either do not find permanency or age out of the system,21 this
Article suggests that certain choices and timeframes are optimal for
a model statute.
19. As of this writing, no state permitting reinstatement of parental rights has released
any official data about the number of reinstatements in their jurisdictions. However, accord-
ing to qualitative information from Los Angeles, California, courts in that county review
about one reinstatement petition per month. Susan M. Getman & Steve Christian, Reinstating
Parental Rights: Another Path to Permanency?, 26 PROTECTING CHILDREN, no. 1, 2011, at 58, 64.
20. Taylor, supra note 10, at 331, 343; see Diane Riggs, Permanence Can Mean Going Home,
ADOPTALK (N. Am. Counsel on Adoptable Children, St. Paul, Minn.), Spring 2006, available at
http://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/permanence.html (outlining process used in several New
York cases to vacate the order terminating parental rights). Notably, North Dakota law explic-
itly states that general modification principles do not apply to orders terminating parental
rights. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-37 (2013). An order terminating parental rights may be va-
cated by the court upon motion of the parent if the child is not in an adoptive placement and
the person having custody of the child consents in writing to the vacation of the decree. Id.;
see also Barbara White Stack, Teen in Flight in the Public Care System but on the Lam, 14-Year-Old
Longs for Someone Who Cares, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sep. 12, 2004, at C1 (showing that
similar reverse terminations have been performed in Pennsylvania, where no restoration stat-
ute exists. “A radical solution has been pursued for a few . . . teens by the Child Advocacy
Unit of the Defender’s Association of Philadelphia . . . It has persuaded judges to reverse
termination in two cases and send the teens back to parents.”).
21. The federal data collection system categorizes these youth who exit the child welfare
system largely due to turning eighteen as “emancipated.” See infra note 25.
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I. THE LACK OF PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN IN THE AMERICAN
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
The American child welfare system has over 100,000 children
whose parental rights have been terminated but for whom no adop-
tive family has been found.22 In addition, an increasing number of
adolescents are aging out of the child welfare system with no family
or adult support.23 With fewer adoption prospects for older chil-
dren and children of color,24 reunification with biological parents
may be the most viable permanency option for some children.
A. Creating a Class of Legal Orphans: Lisa and Many Others Like Her
According to data submitted by state child welfare agencies to
the U.S. Children’s Bureau, Administration for Children, Youth
and Families, in 2011 there were 104,000 children in the American
child welfare system waiting to be adopted.25 These waiting children
are also known as legal orphans. They are children whose ties to
biological parents have been legally severed and have the goal of
adoption but have not yet been adopted.26
Although the number of adoptions in the American child welfare
system has increased, the data shows that there are twice as many
children waiting to be adopted in a given year. For example, in
2011, there were 104,000 waiting children and 51,000 adoption fi-
nalizations.27 Older children have an especially difficult time
finding families. Indeed, in recent years, the percentage of older
children waiting for adoptive families has increased. In 2002, five
percent of children waiting to be adopted were ages sixteen and
22. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NO. 19, THE AFCARS
REPORT, PRELIMINARY FY 2011 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport19.pdf [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT 2011].
23. Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 61.
24. See infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
25. AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 1. AFCARS collects case-level information
on children in foster care and those who have been adopted with public agency involvement.
The 2011 data of approximately 104,000 waiting children does not include children like Lisa
because her goal was no longer adoption and instead was changed to “Independent Living,”
which is often referred to as an “Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement” (APPLA)
or “Emancipation.” In 2011, five percent of children in placement, which equals roughly
20,000 children, had APPLA or emancipation as their goal. They would not be considered
waiting children under the federal data collection system. Id.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 1.
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seventeen.28 By 2011, that percentage had increased to seven per-
cent of waiting children.29
The 2011 child welfare data also shows that only twelve percent
of the waiting children lived in pre-adoptive homes.30 Even though
these children have adoption as their permanency plan,31 the child
welfare system placed most of these waiting children in foster
homes, group homes, and residential facilities rather than with fam-
ilies considering adopting them.32 Although most waiting children
were placed in foster homes (seventy-seven percent), almost ten
percent were placed in group homes and institutions.33 According
to Melinda Atkinson, these group homes are an especially poor
placement for youth because they “often hinder the development
of relationships with members of the community and give youths
fewer opportunities to become adopted or develop adult
mentors.”34
Additionally, the 2011 data indicats that, on average, twenty-three
months had elapsed since the rights of waiting children’s parents
had been terminated.35 In other words, legal orphans in the Ameri-
can child welfare system were still waiting for a new family two years
after their parents’ rights were terminated.36
It may seem that these children are better off as legal orphans,
without ties to their biological parents. However, research shows
28. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NO. 12, THE AFCARS
REPORT, FINAL ESTIMATES FOR FY 1998 THROUGH FY 2002, at 10 (2006), available at http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport12.pdf [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT
1998–2002].
29. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 4.
30. Id.; see also Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 58, 59–61 (discussing how large
percentage of waiting children live in group homes).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(C) (2012) (contemplating adoption as one such “permancy
plan”); see also Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8 (2001) (discussing four potential perma-
nency plans considered at a child’s permanency hearing).
32. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 4.
33. Id.
34. Melinda Atkinson, Aging Out of Foster Care: Towards a Universal Safety Net for Former
Foster Care Youth, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 188–89 (2008); see also Alice Bussiere, Perma-
nence for Older Foster Youth, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 231, 236 (2006). In the United States, only five
percent of children in foster care are adopted. The remaining children are often placed in
congregate care setting. See Erwin A. Blackstone et al., Market Segmentation in Child Adoption,
28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 220, 220 (2008).
35. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 5.
36. Gretta Cushing & Sarah B. Greenblatt, Vulnerability to Foster Care Drift After the Termi-
nation of Parental Rights, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 694, 697–98 (2009); see also Patrick
Parkinson, Child Protection, Permanency Planning and Children’s Right to Family Life, 17 INTL J.L.
POL’Y & FAM. 147, 159 (2003) (suggesting that having rights terminated and becoming “le-
gally freed” for adoption, but “not chosen,” is one of the worst outcomes for children
because it undermines their sense of self-worth and security).
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that legal orphans have numerous disadvantages in compairosn to
their peers who are still connected to their biological parents.
These disadvantages include loss of emotional support, inheritance
rights, and health insurance coverage.37
B. More Adoptions, Even More Waiting
Although the passage of ASFA in 1997 led to an increase in adop-
tions, the overall adoption prospects remain bleak for most
children in the American child welfare system, particularly for
Black children and children over the age of eight.38
In 1998, the first year after ASFA took effect, 37,000 children
were adopted through the child welfare system.39 By 2011, the num-
ber of adoptions increased to nearly 51,000.40 However, as detailed
above, the 51,000 adoptions in 2011 still meant that less than half of
the 104,000 waiting children in the American child welfare system
found a “forever family.”41 Moreover, the rate of adoptions in the
American child welfare system has declined recently, with a high of
57,000 adoptions in 2009, 54,000 in 2010, and 51,000 in 2011.42
For those children in the child welfare system who are fortunate
enough to be adopted, they must wait a long time for their adop-
tion to be finalized. The 2011 data shows that, on average, nearly
fourteen months elapsed between the termination of parental
rights and adoption.43
The data also shows that race and age significantly impact a
child’s chance of being adopted. The data suggests that Black wait-
ing children are adopted at a disproportionately lower rate than
Hipsanic and White children.44 Between 2000 and 2011, the adop-
tion percentage of Black children has consistently been between
37. See generally Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights of
Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125 (2005); infra Part I.C.
38. See infra notes 44–54.
39. See AFCARS REPORT 1998–2002, supra note 28, at 1.
40. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 1.
41. “Forever family” is a term commonly used by the child welfare system to describe
families willing to adopt and care for a child forever. CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L. PIERCE,
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 107 (3rd ed. 2007).
42. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TRENDS IN FOSTER
CARE AND ADOPTION—FY 2002–FY 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption.pdf.
43. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 5.
44. See Kerry DeVooght et al., Number of Children Adopted from Foster Care Increases in 2009,
in TRENDS IN ADOPTIONS FROM FOSTER CARE IN THE WAKE OF CHILD WELFARE REFORMS 7 (Anal-
ysis No. 4, 2011), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.
fosteringconnections.org/ContentPages/2466875399.pdf.
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five and nine percentage points lower than the percentage of wait-
ing Black children.45 For example, in 2011, Black children
comprised twenty-eight percent of children waiting but only twenty-
three percent of children adopted.46 This is in contrast to White
children, who were forty percent of waiting children and forty-five
percent of adoptions, as well as Hispanic children who were twenty-
two percent of waiting children and twenty-one percent of adop-
tions in 2011.47
Moreover, the disproportionally lower rates of adoption for Black
children are further demonstrated by comparing racial distribu-
tions for children in the general population, foster care population,
and adoption finalizations. In 2011, fifty-three percent of children
in the general population were White, but White children repre-
sented forty-one percent of children in foster care and forty-five
percent of all children adopted.48 On the other hand, Black chil-
dren comprised fourteen percent of children in the general
population, but represented twenty-seven percent of children in
foster care and twenty-three percent of children adopted.49 Lastly,
in 2011, Hispanic children comprised twenty-four percent of chil-
dren in the general population and twenty-one percent of children
in foster care and finalized adoptions.50 The 2011 data stands in
stark contrast to the data from 2000, when Black and White chil-
dren each represented thirty-eight percent of adoptions, and
Hispanic children represented fifteen percent of adoptions.51
These 2000 adoption rates were almost identical to the percentage
of children in foster care by race: Black children were thirty-nine
percent of the foster care population, White children were thirty-
eight percent, and Hispanic children were fifteen percent.52
Finally, adoption data also suggests that older children are less
likely to be adopted now than before ASFA’s passage.53 Research
45. See id.; CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NO. 18, THE
AFCARS REPORT, PRELIMINARY FY 2010 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2011, at 5, 7 (2011), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport18.pdf; AFCARS Report 2011,
supra note 22, at 4–5.
46. See AFCARS Report 2011, supra note 22, at 4–5.
47. Id.
48. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 2–5; Child Population By Race, KIDS
COUNT DATA CENTER, http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/103-child-population-
by-race?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/1/any/false/867/66,67,12/424 (last updated May, 2012).
49. See sources cited supra note 48.
50. See sources cited supra note 48.
51. See AFCARS REPORT 1998–2002, supra note 28, at 12.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Penelope L. Maza, A New Look at the Role of ASFA and Children’s Ages in Adoption, 23
THE ROUNTABLE, no. 1, 2009, at 1–2 (discussing the large percentage of children over nine-
years-old waiting to be adopted).
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highlights an alarming adoption trend for older children: a critical
tipping point occurs at age nine, after which the prospects of being
adopted decrease dramatically.54
Since the implementation of ASFA, and even as children over the
age of nine have started to comprise a larger percentage of the wait-
ing children, older children have continued to represent the same
percentage of overall adoptions.55 For instance, in 1998, children
ages nine through seventeen were thirty-nine percent of all waiting
children and twenty-eight percent of all adoptions.56 However, in
2006, older children represented forty-four percent of all waiting
children but still only twenty-eight percent of adoptions.57 In 2011,
children ages nine to seventeen represented forty-two percent of
waiting children and just twenty-six percent of adoptions.58
Given the sheer number of children who do not get adopted,
along with the lower adoption rates for Black children and children
over the age of eight, the American child welfare system should
start looking at rehabilitated biological parents as the solution for
some of these children who desperately want a family to love and
care for them. One concern over reinstating parental rights as a
permanency option may be the possible impact that reinstatement
will have on the rate of adoptions. However, the proposed and ex-
isting statutes allowing reinstatement of parental rights would only
impact children with no viable adoption prospects.59 Moreover,
there appears to be no adverse impact on the rate of public child
welfare adoptions in states that allow reinstatement of parental
rights.60 Thus, reinstatement of parental rights is and should be
considered a viable option for these children.
54. Id. at 1 (“Early analyses of AFCARS data showed that age at waiting is the most criti-
cal characteristic related to the likelihood that waiting children will be adopted. These early
analyses and all analyses conducted since that time have consistently shown that between the
ages of 8 and 9, waiting children are more likely to continue to wait than to be adopted.”).
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 2–3; see also AFCARS REPORT 1998–2002, supra note 28, at 10, 12.
57. Maza, supra note 53, at 2–3; see also CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., NO. 14, THE AFCARS REPORT, PRELIMINARY FY 2006 ESTIMATES AS OF JANUARY
2008, at 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport
14.pdf.
58. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 4–5.
59. See Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 66.
60. For example, according to the AFCARS reported data for Washington and Nevada,
states that both enacted their reinstatement provisions in 2007, the number of children
adopted who were involved with the child welfare system was not subsequently adversely im-
pacted. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
OUTCOMES 2008–2011, at 220, 349 (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf; CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
WELFARE OUTCOMES 2006–2009, at 220, 350 (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cwo06-09/cwo06-09.pdf.
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C. Don’t Forget About Us: Youth Aging Out of the System
In addition to the 104,000 children waiting to be adopted in the
American child welfare system, thousands of children age out of the
system each year. These are youth, age eighteen or older, who are
no longer eligible for continued child welfare services or who vol-
untarily have chosen to leave the system.
Although the total number of children in foster care in the
American child welfare system has declined steadily over the past
ten years,61 the number of youth aging out of the system each year
has increased dramatically.62 In 2002, 20,358 youth aged out of the
child welfare system.63 By 2011, this number had increased by al-
most one-third to 26,286 youth.64
The increasing number of youth who age out of the system, in-
stead of finding permanency with a family, is problematic on several
fronts. Research over the past three decades suggests that, as a
group, former foster youth, including those who age out of the sys-
tem, struggle more than their peers across a variety of domains,
including education, homelessness, employment, substance abuse,
mental health, early parenthood, involvement with the criminal jus-
tice system, economic difficulties, and public assistance usage.65
Also, and unlike other young adults who may have the option of
returning home to parents during difficult times, foster care youth
do not have the option of reentering or relying on the supports,
financial and otherwise, of the foster care system once they age
out.66
Numerous studies demonstrate that youth who age out of the
child welfare system are more likely to:
Number of Children Adopted Involved with Public Child Welfare Agency by Year
2006 2007* 2008 2009 2010 2011
Nevada 446 466 470 525 644 818
Washington 1195 1291 1261 1634 1633 1568
* Reinstatement provision enacted in 2007 in both states.
Id.
61. See TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note 42, at 1, 3.
62. See Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 61.
63. AFCARS REPORT 1998–2002, supra note 28, at 8.
64. AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 3.
65. Atkinson, supra note 34, at 183; see also Casey Family Programs, Improving Outcomes
for Older Youth in Foster Care, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.casey.org/research/pub-
lications/pdf/WhitePaper_ImprovingOutcomesOlderYouth_FR.pdf.
66. Atkinson, supra note 34, at 183.
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• Become homeless;67
• Drop out of high school;68
• Be underemployed;69
• Have problems with drugs and alcohol;70
• Struggle with mental illness;71
• Become young parents;72
• Become involved with the criminal justice system.73
In an effort to aid the youth who age out of foster care, Congress
passed the Foster Care Independence Act in 1999, which increased
the money offered to states to use for independent living programs
and transitional services for young people between the ages of eigh-
teen and twenty-one.74 Even with this program, depending upon
which state they live in, eighteen-year-olds aging out of foster care
may receive substantially less financial support, housing services,
and Medicaid health insurance coverage than they did at seven-
teen.75 Ensuring access to whatever aging-out or transitional
programs are available is even more difficult in states that have
eliminated court jurisdiction for youth over eighteen.76
67. Id.; see also OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., HOUSING FOR YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE 4 (2012), available at http://www.
huduser.org/publications/pdf/HousingFosterCare_LiteratureReview_0412_v2.pdf.
68. See MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF
FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 19, at 22 (2005) (finding that approximately fifty-
eight percent of youth who had lived in foster care had a high school diploma at age
nineteen, compared to eighty-seven percent of their same-age peers in a comparable national
sample).
69. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMING OF AGE: EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH WHO AGE
OUT OF FOSTER CARE THROUGH THEIR MIDDLE TWENTIES 7 (2008), available at http://aspe.
hhs.gov/hsp/08/fosteremp/report.pdf.
70. See COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 68, at 40, 45 (finding that former foster youth report
more than twice the need for hospitalization due to use of illegal drugs than their peers and
are three times more likely to need substance abuse treatment than their peers).
71. Id. at 45 (finding that more than twenty percent of former foster youth reported
requiring psychological counseling compared to only nine percent of nineteen-year-olds
nationwide).
72. Id. at 56 (finding that almost one-third of the young women in the study reported
having children by age nineteen compared to only twelve percent of the nineteen-year-old
females nationwide and that nearly fourteen percent of former foster youth males had a
child compared to only six-and-a-half percent of nationwide nineteen-year-old males).
73. See id. at 60–64.
74. Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A Developmental Per-
spective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 561 (2006); see also Atkinson, supra
note 34, at 196.
75. Magyar, supra note 74, at 563; see also Atkinson, supra note 34, at 197–98.
76. See American Bar Association, Center on Children and the Law, Continuing Court
Jurisdiction in Support of 18 to 21 Year-Old Foster Youth, at 3–6, 16 (2008), available at
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By failing to properly support these older youth and help them
find a forever family, the American child welfare system is sending
more than 25,000 young adults into the world each year with tre-
mendous challenges to overcome on their own. Although some
youth who age out of the child welfare system avoid the many social
and legal problems discussed above and go on to become successful
and productive adults, the data shows that these courageous young
men and women are, by far, the exceptions among their peers.77
Research also shows another important reason for considering
reinstatement of parental rights for youth who are on track to age
out. Youth who exit the child welfare system are often already in
contact with relatives in their biological families, including their
parents.78 In a 2007 study of former foster youth, eighty-three per-
cent of twenty-one-year-olds who had aged out of care reported
having contact with one or more biological family members at least
once a week.79 The data suggests that because most of these youth
are already connected with their biological families, the American
child welfare system should explore a policy to reunify at least some
of these older youth with their biological parents.
II. REINSTATING PARENTAL RIGHTS BY STATUTE
Before the child welfare system can consider reunifying or re-
turning children to biological parents whose rights were previously
terminated, there must be a mechanism under the law to reinstate
or restore the parent-child relationship. Although in some states
there may be several options under current law to reunify children
with biological parents whose rights were terminated,80 the recent
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_and_
the_law/empowerment/court_jurisdiction.doc.
77. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text; see also Wendy Ruderman, Replanting
the Family Tree, PHILLY.COM, (Aug. 22, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-22/news/
41433616_1_hand-sanitizer-lasagna-foster-care (profiling a youth who aged out of the Phila-
delphia child welfare system and is now pursuing a doctorate in chemistry at New York
University). Given the known outcomes for youth exiting the child welfare system, the efforts
to assist older youth and prepare them for adulthood need to be evaluated and improved. See
generally Alena M. Hadley et al., What Works for Older Youth During the Transition to Adulthood:
Lessons from Experimental Evaluations of Programs and Interventions, in CHILD TRENDS FACT SHEET
(Publ’n No. 2010-05, 2010), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/03/Child_Trends-2010_03_09_FS_WWOlderYouth.pdf.
78. Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 62–63. See generally Collins et al., supra note 8,
at 54 (providing an overview of recent studies finding that former foster youth live with bio-
logical family members after exiting the child welfare system).
79. MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FOR-
MER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 21, at 17 (2007).
80. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
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trend among states is to enact a statutory provision that sets forth
required criteria and a clear process for courts to reinstate parental
rights.
By year, the following thirteen states have enacted statutes that
permit the reinstatement of parental rights:
• California (2005);81
• Nevada82 and Washington83 (2007);
• Louisiana (2008);84
• Illinois85 and Oklahoma86 (2009);
• Hawaii87 and New York88 (2010);
• Maine89 and North Carolina90 (2011);
• Delaware,91 Minnesota,92 and Utah93 (2013).94
By enacting a provision in 2005, California served as a trailblazer
in recognizing that a statute could help some waiting children find
permanency with their rehabilitated biological parents.95 However,
81. CA. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (2008).
82. NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.170 (2011).
83. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215 (2013).
84. LA. CHLD CODE ANN. art. 1051 (2013).
85. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-34 (2013).
86. OKLA. ANN. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909 (2011).
87. HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34 (Supp. 2011).
88. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 635 (2011).
89. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4059 (2012).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114 (2011).
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1116 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013, chs. 1–185).
92. MINN. STAT. § 260C.329 (2013). Although the Family Reunification Act of 2013 be-
came effective on August 1, 2013, similar versions had not gained final passage in the prior
2009 and 2011 legislative sessions in Minnesota. See H.R. 1462, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn.
2009), and H.F. 0749 and S.F. 1339, 2011 Leg., 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011).
93. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1401 (LexisNexis 2013).
94. Some states have statutes that permit reinstatement of parental rights, but only for
parents whose rights were voluntarily terminated. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089(h) (2007);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(K) (2009). In other words, the parents had consented to the termi-
nation and did not oppose the action in court. In addition, some states limit when and who
may file a motion to vacate an order terminating parental rights. See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-6(c)
(2013); IOWA CODE § 232.117(10) (2013).
95. California enacted a statute to reinstate parental rights shortly after the California
Court of Appeals invited the legislature to consider allowing juvenile courts limited discre-
tion to reinstate parental rights where a child would otherwise be a legal orphan. See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(2) (West 2008); see also In re Jerred H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In that case, Jerred, a fourteen-year-old, filed a petition to reinstate
parental rights after his adoption by his stepfather fell through. Problematically, the termina-
tion order had been finalized, so there was no legal basis for relief. In affirming the father’s
inability to resurrect the relationship, the Court of Appeals noted:
We join the trial court and county counsel in observing the harshness of the result we
reach . . . In all likelihood, Jerred will be left a “legal orphan” . . . To avoid such an
unhappy consequence, legislation may be advisable authorizing judicial intervention
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the statutes subsequently adopted by other states are arguably more
sophisticated and comprehensive in their approach to defining the
criteria and processes involved with reinstating parental rights. As
detailed below, each state has a different approach to reinstating
parental rights, including provisions about the filing processes; re-
quired timeframes; and roles for the courts, public agencies,
parents, and children.
A. Moving Party
One of the most important aspects for states to consider when
contemplating a reinstatement statute is which party (or parties)
has standing to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of
parental rights. As different states’ bills have moved through the
legislative process, there have been discussions about whether the
child, public agency, and/or the parents should have standing in
these actions.96
These discussions have led states to different conclusions. Most
states allow the child97 or legal custodian to file a petition request-
ing reinstatement of parental rights. However, the reinstatement
statutes in California,98 Oklahoma,99 Washington,100 and Utah101
specify that only the child or the child’s attorney, guardian ad litem,
legal representative, or legal custodian can be the moving party. A
under very limited circumstances following the termination of parental rights and
prior to the completion of adoption.
Id. at 485–86; see also Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 64–65 (explaining the sequence
of events leading to the passage of California’s law).
96. Getman & Christian, supra note 19, at 65 (discussing how California’s bill was report-
edly amended to only allow children to file petitions for reinstatement to overcome
objections from adoption advocates and concerns that parents might try to interfere with a
pending adoption by filing a petition).
97. Not every state provides counsel to children in all child welfare court proceedings.
See generally CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INSTITUTE & FIRST STAR, A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2d
ed. 2009), available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/misc/final_rtc_2nd_edition_lr.pdf (re-
viewing the state laws that provide counsel to children in child welfare court proceedings and
finding that some states only provide counsel on a discretionary basis). As such, in order for a
child to petition the court and the court to effectively evaluate whether reinstatement of
parental rights is appropriate for certain families under a statutory scheme, counsel for chil-
dren is needed. Some of the existing statutes include a provision appointing counsel for
children. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215(3) (West 2013) (appointing free coun-
sel for child wishing to petition for reinstatement).
98. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (West 2008).
99. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909 (West 2011).
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215 (West 2013).
101. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1403 (LexisNexis 2013).
WINTER 2014] Bio Family 2.0 483
few states, such as Hawaii102 and North Carolina,103 permit both the
agency and the child to petition, whereas Illinois,104 Maine,105 and
Minnesota106 only allow the public child welfare agency to file peti-
tions. As of this writing, only New York permits biological parents to
petition the court for reinstatement. New York’s statute, however,
contains language that suggests that compromises were made to ad-
dress concerns that parents might try to misuse the reinstatement
process. For example, the statute requires the parents to obtain the
consent of the original petitioner from the prior termination pro-
ceeding (usually the public child welfare agency) or to secure a
finding that such consent is being withheld without good cause.107
B. Age of the Child
A second policy choice for states to consider is whether there
should be a minimum age for children to be considered for reunifi-
cation with their rehabilitated parents. Most statutes set forth a
minimum age for a child before reinstatement will be considered.
Of those statutes that set a minimum age, most fall into a range of
twelve to fifteen years old.108 However, California109 and Nevada110
have no age requirements. In addition, even some of the states with
an age minimum allow younger children to petition with a showing
of extraordinary circumstances.111
102. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (2006).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114(a) (2011) (the guardian ad litem attorney or a county
department of social services with custody of a juvenile may file to reinstate if several condi-
tions are satisfied).
104. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-34(1) (West 2013) (providing that the motion may
be filed only by Department of Children and Family services).
105. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4059 (2012) (allowing only the agency to file for
reinstatement).
106. MINN. STAT. § 260C.329 (2013) (permitting only the agency counsel to file a
petition).
107. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 635(c) (McKinney 2011); see also Getman & Christian,
supra note 19, at 66.
108. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.329(6) (2013) (requiring children to be at least fifteen
years old); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114(a)(1) (2011) (requiring children to be at least twelve
years old).
109. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(2) (West 2008).
110. NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.70 (2007).
111. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114(a)(1) (2011); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-
1403 (2)(b) (permitting siblings over the age of twelve years old to include their siblings who
are under twelve years old in their petition for restoring parental rights).
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C. Amount of Time Since Termination
Third, by requiring a period of time to pass before reinstatement
can be considered, states are trying to ensure that adoption pros-
pects have been fully explored prior to returning a child to their
biological parents as a permanency option. The majority of the en-
acted statutes require between one and three years112 to pass from
the termination of parental rights before a petition for reinstate-
ment can be filed.113 On the other hand, Louisiana114 and Nevada115
chose not to require any waiting period before reinstatement can
be considered, and although California requires that three years
pass before a court can consider reinstatement, it also provides that
the time requirement can be waived if it is demonstrated that it is in
the best interest of the child.116
D. Court Process
A fourth important aspect for states to consider is the court pro-
cess that occurs when reinstating parental rights, such as how many
and what type of hearings will be held, which evidentiary standard
applies, and which party has the burden of proof. Of the thirteen
states with statutes that allow for reinstatement of parental rights,
all require that the court find that reinstatement is in the best inter-
est of the child at a finalization hearing before the reinstatement
process can proceed. Twelve of the thirteen states117 require a find-
ing by clear and convincing evidence, which is the evidentiary
burden to terminate parental rights as established by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Santosky v. Kramer.118
112. Some have argued that three years is a reasonable amount of time for a parent seek-
ing to make apprioriate changes to do so and demonstrate the change. MELISSA CARTER &
KIRSTEN WIDNER, REINSTATEMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS SOLVING
THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL ORPHANS (2008), available at http://bartoncenter.net/uploads/fall
2011updates/juv_code_rewrite/CarterWidnerReinstatingParentalRights.pdf.
113. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4059 (8)(C)(1) (2011) (requiring at least one year
to pass before a parent’s rights can be reinstated); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909
(A)(3) (West 2011) (allowing a parent to petition for rights three years after his or her rights
were terminated if the child has not received a permenancy plan).
114. See LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 1051 (2008) (stating that when children are fifteen or
older there is no required amount of time that must pass for parental rights to be reinstated).
115. NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.70 (2007).
116. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (West 2008).
117. Nevada has a preponderance of the evidence standard for reinstatement proceed-
ings. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.190(3) (Lexis-Nexis 2007).
118. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires more than a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard in a termination of parental rights hearing).
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Some of the more recent statutes require the court to consider,
at a preliminary hearing, whether certain threshold criteria to rein-
state parental rights are met.119 States requiring a preliminary
hearing usually insist that the court make certain findings before
the child can start to visit or live with the biological parent on a trial
basis.120 These findings may include, for instance, whether the pro-
scribed amount of time has passed since the termination of
parental rights, whether the child cannot be adopted in a reasona-
ble amount of time, and whether both the biological parent and
child are willing to consider reinstatement.121
E. Role of Child Welfare Agency
Another area where the statutes vary is how they define the role
for the public child welfare agency in the reinstatement process.
Although some contain only minimal information about what the
agency is required to do, the more recent statutory schemes tend to
be more specific about the expectations for, and responsibilities of,
the agency. As discussed above, some states permit the agency to
file the petition to reinstate parental rights.122 Other statutes re-
quire the public child welfare agency to submit reports to the court
detailing, among other things, how the parent remediated the is-
sues leading to the prior termination of parental rights and the
progress made towards reinstatement.123 In those states permitting
or requiring trial placements with the biological parents, the stat-
utes usually clarify that the public child welfare agency is
responsible for placing the child with the biological parents, as well
as supervising the placement.124
Some statutes also require that the public child welfare agency
provide services to both the child and biological parent to assist
with the reinstatement or, as some states refer to it, “transition” pro-
cess for the family.125 Most statutes that require such assistance
119. HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34(3) (Supp. 2011).
120. See, e.g., id.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-114(a), (g) (2011).
122. See OKLA. ANN. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34
(Supp. 2011).
123. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34(d) (Supp. 2011) (requiring a report to be prepared
by the child welfare agency for the court prior to the preliminary hearing).
124. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114(i)(2) (2011).
125. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34(f)(2) (Supp. 2011).
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include language that the services or other relief be deemed “neces-
sary” or “in the best interest” of the child before they are
provided.126
Finally, some statutes specify that the public child welfare agency
has a duty to provide notice to children if they meet the reinstate-
ment criteria127 or if their biological parent contacts the agency to
inquire about the child.128 This requirement for the child welfare
agency is included in some of the more recent statutes and is likely
aimed at addressing concerns arising from statutes that do not al-
low the biological parents to file a petition for reinstatement. By
requiring the public child welfare agency to contact the child and
the child’s attorney if a biological parent inquires about the child,
the statutes are ensuring that children eligible for reinstatement are
aware that their parent is interested. With that knowledge in hand,
the child’s attorney can facilitate a discussion about whether the
child wants to file a petition for the court’s consideration.
III. PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE TO REINSTATE PARENTAL RIGHTS—
“LISA’S LAW”
This Section proposes a model statute to reinstate parental
rights. It combines the lessons learned from the data about perma-
nency in the child welfare system (see Section I) and the existing
reinstatement statutes (see Section II).129
As for the former, the data about permanency in the child wel-
fare system provides useful information about the age when
children are likely to get adopted, how long they may wait for that
adoption to occur, and what may happen to children if they never
find a permanent family. With regard to the latter, and as discussed
above, the provisions, criteria, and court processes vary significantly
among the thirteen states whose statutes currently permit reinstate-
ment of parental rights.
The model statute uses the child welfare data to inform its crite-
ria for when reinstatement of parental rights is permissible and to
outline the rights and responsibilities for the child, parent, child
126. See, e.g, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114(g)(8) (2011).
127. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1404 (West 2013). The Utah statute also requires
the agency to contact the child’s biological parent(s) and explain the rights and responsibili-
ties of reinstatement.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(2) (2012).
129. See Appendix A, infra, for the text of the proposed model statute; see also Randi J.
O’Donnell, Note, A Second Chance for Children and Families: A Model Statute to Reinstate Parental
Rights after Termination, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 362, 364–75 (2010) (proposing some provisions for
a statute to reinstate parental rights).
WINTER 2014] Bio Family 2.0 487
welfare agency, and court. The provisions of the model statute ulti-
mately provide guidance in assessing whether reinstatement of
parental rights is a viable permanency option and in the best inter-
est of the child.
A. When Should Reinstatement of Parental Rights Be Considered
for Children?
First, based upon the data from the American child welfare sys-
tem, a statute should allow petitions requesting reinstatement of
parental rights to be filed beginning two years after the termination
proceeding. Given that the average time for adoptions is around
fourteen months after termination of parental rights, having a two-
year timeframe provides sufficient opportunity for the child welfare
system to find an adoptive family for the child.130 However, the
model statute also creates judicial discretion for rare instances
when waiting the two years before considering reinstatement may
not be in the best interest of the child. Such discretion may be exer-
cised when extraordinary circumstances can be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Second, the data is very clear about the age when children be-
come less likely to be adopted; children age nine and older have
drastically reduced chances of finding a permanent family.131 As
such, the model statute proposes a minimum age of ten for chil-
dren who want to have their parent’s rights reinstated. By selecting
age ten, the statute incorporates both data about the tipping point
at age nine for adoptions and the average fourteen-month time pe-
riod for adoption finalizations. However, as with the time period for
filing, the model statute provides judicial discretion to override the
minimum age of ten in extraordinary circumstances.
Finally, the model statute proposes that both the child and
agency should be able to file petitions requesting that the court
consider reinstating parental rights. As the outcome data for youth
who age out of the child welfare system shows, children clearly have
the most at stake in the system’s efforts to find permanency.132 As
such, the child and/or the child’s attorney should be able to peti-
tion the court for possible parental rights reinstatement. The
agencies should also be able to file petitions because they often
130. See AFCARS REPORT 2011, supra note 22, at 5.
131. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text.
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have access to information and resources that may make reinstate-
ment a viable permanency option for the children in their custody.
Moreover, since agencies are charged with legal guardianship of
the children and the responsibility to find them a permanent fam-
ily, having the ability to petition the court for any viable
permanency option is important—whether that permanency is
found with adoptive parents or a return to the biological parents.
The model statute does not allow biological parents to petition in
order to quell concerns about the misuse of the reinstatement
mechanism by biological parents seeking to interfere with or stop
pending adoptions.133 In addition, if biological parents were able to
file petitions seeking their own reinstatement after a termination of
parental rights proceeding, they arguably would have less incentive
to comply with services or court orders at the beginning of the child
welfare case.134
B. How Should Reinstatement Petitions be Processed, Evaluated,
and Finalized?
By laying out a clear process for courts and parties to follow when
exploring reinstatement of parental rights, the model statute at-
tempts to keep the focus on the biological parent’s rehabilitation as
well as whether reunification is in the best interest of the child.
The model statute requires a preliminary hearing to assess
whether the petitioner has met the threshold requirements of the
reinstatement process by clear and convincing evidence. For in-
stance, the petitioner must prove that both the parent and child
consent to the reinstatement and that the biological parent can
provide a safe and stable home for the child. If the petitioner meets
all of the requirements, the model statute suggests that the court
can then order visitation between the child and biological parent or
move directly to a trial placement, depending upon the best inter-
est of the child.
During the required six-month trial placement, the child re-
mains in the agency’s custody. Thus, the agency supervises the
placement and offers any services needed to support the child and
biological parent. However, the model statute provides that, if the
133. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Although New York is the only state cur-
rently allowing parents to file petitions to reinstate parental rights, other states might be
willing to grant parents the right to file with similar or additional compromises about the
scope of reinstatement and what kinds of prior abuse or neglect render the child and parent
ineligible for reinstatement as a permanency option.
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child has to be removed from the biological parent due to proven
abuse or neglect, the petition is automatically dismissed. After the
trial placement, the agency must produce a report to the court that
assesses, among other things, the biological parent’s change in cir-
cumstances since the termination of parental rights and the child
and biological parent’s ability to clearly express that they support
the reinstatement.
After a successful trial placement and positive agency report, the
court holds a finalization hearing for the reinstatement of parental
rights. At the finalization hearing, the court can grant the request
to reinstate parental rights, dismiss the petition, or extend the trial
placement if it is in the best interest of the child. If, after reviewing
the agency report, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the preliminary criteria are still met, the trial placement was
successful, and that reinstatement is in the best interest of the child,
the court will reinstate parental rights. However, the model statute
provides that reinstatement does not vacate the prior termination
of parental rights order and does not impact the rights of the other
parent as applicable.
Finally, the model statute addresses two other important issues
that states should clarify in their provisions: notice and right to
counsel. The statute requires that, if biological parents contact the
agency about their child, the agency must notify the child and her
counsel about the parental contact and the right to petition for re-
instatement.135 Additionally, the model statute requires that counsel
be provided for all children and for parents who meet the income
guideline for public defense. By requiring that the parties have
counsel, the model statute tries to ensure that the courts have accu-
rate and complete information about the possible reinstatement
and that the hearings are efficient.136
CONCLUSION
As the American child welfare system struggles each year to find
adoptive families for more than 100,000 legal orphans and to meet
the needs of an increasing number of youth who age out of the
system, policymakers and courts should consider the possibility that
135. This provision may also help address some concerns about the model statute prohib-
iting parents from being able to file for reinstatement.
136. See Nina Ingwer Van Wormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to
the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 993–97 (2007) (discussing the challenges that
pro se parties bring to litigation and court efficiency).
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rehabilitated biological parents may be the only option for a loving
and safe forever family for some of these children.
By enacting a comprehensive statute with criteria reflecting avail-
able child welfare data and clearly defining the reinstatement legal
standard and court processes, state legislatures can provide clarity
and safeguards for revisiting biological parents as a pemanency op-
tion for some children who do not have viable adoption prospects.
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APPENDIX A—PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
§ Reinstatement of parental rights
(a) A child whose parent’s rights have been involuntarily or vol-
untarily terminated, the child’s attorney, or the public child welfare
agency with custody of the child may file a motion to reinstate the
parent’s rights if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) the child is at least ten years of age, or, if the child is
younger than ten, the motion alleges extraordinary circumstances
requiring consideration of the motion;
(2) the child does not have a legal parent, is not in an adoptive
placement, and is not likely to be adopted within a reasonable pe-
riod of time; and
(3) the order terminating parental rights was entered at least
two years before the filing of the motion, unless the motion alleges
extraordinary circumstances requiring consideration of the motion
or the court has found, or the child’s attorney and the public child
welfare agency with custody of the child stipulate, that the child’s
permanent plan is no longer adoption.
(b) If a motion could be filed under subsection (a) of this Sec-
tion and the parent whose rights have been terminated contacts the
public child welfare agency with custody of the child regarding re-
instatement of the parent’s rights, the public child welfare agency
shall notify the child and the child’s attorney within thirty days with
the name and address of the former parent who has contacted the
agency, in addition to notifying the child that he has a right to file a
motion for reinstatement of parental rights.
(c) The party filing a motion to reinstate parental rights shall
serve the motion on each of the following non-movants:
(1) the child;
(2) the child’s attorney;
(3) the public child welfare agency with custody of the child;
(4) the former parent whose rights the motion seeks to have
reinstated; and
(5) the child’s tribe if applicable.
(d) If the child served under subsection (c) no longer has an
attorney, the court will appoint an attorney to represent the child
upon the filing of the motion described in subsection (a). The for-
mer parent who is served under subsection (c) is only entitled to
appointed counsel if he or she meets the income eligibility criteria
for public counsel as defined by the Office of the Public Defender.
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(e) The movant shall ask the clerk to calendar the case for a pre-
liminary hearing on the motion for reinstatement of parental rights
within sixty days of the filing of the motion at the appropriate ses-
sion of family court. The movant shall give at least twenty-one days
notice of the hearing and state its purpose to the other persons
listed in subsections (c)(1) through (c)(4) of this section. In addi-
tion, the movant shall send a notice of the hearing to the child’s
placement or foster care provider if applicable. Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to make the child’s placement or foster care
provider a party to the proceeding based solely on receiving notice
and the right to be heard.
(f) At least seven days before the preliminary hearing, the public
child welfare agency shall provide to the court and the other parties
as listed in subsection (c) a report that addresses the factors speci-
fied in subsection (g) of this section.
(g) At the preliminary hearing and any subsequent hearing on
the motion, the court shall consider information from the public
child welfare agency with custody of the child, the child, the child’s
attorney, the child’s former parent whose parental rights are the
subject of the motion, the child’s placement or foster care provider,
and any other person or agency that may aid the court in its review.
The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence
as permitted by law, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and
necessary to determine the needs of the child and whether rein-
statement is in the child’s best interest. The court shall consider the
following criteria and make relevant written findings regarding:
(1) what efforts were made to achieve adoption or permanent
guardianship;
(2) whether the former parent whose rights the motion seeks
to have reinstated has remedied the conditions that led to the
child’s removal and termination of the parent’s rights;
(3) whether the child would receive proper care and supervi-
sion in a safe home if placed with the former parent;
(4) the age and maturity of the child and the ability of the
child to express the child’s preference;
(5) the former parent’s willingness to resume contact with the
child and to have parental rights reinstated;
(6) the child’s willingness to resume contact with the former
parent and to have parental rights reinstated;
(7) services that would be needed by the child and the former
parent if the parent’s rights were reinstated; and
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(8) any other criteria the court deems necessary.
(h) At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the court shall
either dismiss the motion or enter an order finding that a prepon-
derance of the evidence shows that the child’s permanent plan
should be the reinstatement of parental rights. If the court does not
dismiss the motion, the court shall conduct interim hearings at
least every six months until the motion is granted or dismissed. In-
terim hearings may be combined with post-termination of parental
rights review hearings as required by law. At each interim hearing,
the court shall assess whether the plan of reinstatement of parental
rights continues to be in the child’s best interest and whether the
public child welfare agency made reasonable efforts to achieve the
permanent plan.
(i) At any hearing under this section, after making proper find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, for any of the following the
court may:
(1) enter an order for visitation between the child and former
parent whose rights the motion seeks to reinstate;
(2) order that the child be placed in the former parent’s home
whose rights the motion seeks to reinstate and that such placement
be supervised by the public child welfare agency either directly or,
when the former parent lives in a different state, through coordina-
tion with the Interstate Compact, or by other personnel as may be
available to the court, subject to conditions applicable to the for-
mer parent as the court may specify;
(3) order the public child welfare agency to provide any transi-
tional or supportive services for the child and former parent whose
rights the motion seeks to be reinstated, or other relief deemed in
the best interest of the child; or
(4) enter other relief as deemed in the best interest of the
child.
(j) Prior to the court granting the motion for reinstatement, the
child must be successfully placed with the former parent for at least
six months.
(k) If the child must be removed from the former parent due to
abuse or neglect allegations prior to the motion for reinstatement
being granted, the court shall dismiss the petition for reinstatement
of parental rights if the court finds the allegations have been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
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(l) The court shall either dismiss or, by a finding of clear and
convincing evidence, grant the motion for reinstatement of paren-
tal rights within twelve months from the date the motion was filed,
unless the court makes written findings why a final determination
cannot be made within that time. If the court makes such findings,
the court shall specify the time frame in which a final order shall be
entered.
(m) An order reinstating parental rights restores all rights, pow-
ers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations of the parent as
to the child, including those relating to custody, control, and sup-
port of the child. This reinstatement is a recognition that the
situation of the parent and child have substantially changed since
the time of the termination of parental rights and reunification is
now appropriate. If a parent’s rights are reinstated, the court shall
be relieved of the duty to conduct periodic reviews.
(n) The granting of a motion for reinstatement of parental rights
does not vacate or otherwise affect the validity of the original order
terminating parental rights.
(o) The granting of a motion for reinstatement of parental rights
for one former parent does not restore or otherwise impact the
rights of the other former parent.
(p) A parent whose rights are reinstated pursuant to this section
is not liable for child support or the costs of any services provided
to the child for the period from the date of the order terminating
the parent’s rights to the date of the order reinstating the parent’s
rights.
(q) This section is retroactive and applies to any child who is
under the jurisdiction of the family court at the time of the hearing
regardless of the date parental rights were terminated.
